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Nevertheless, Eisenbach is a strong reminder of the Court's rapidly developing determination to reverse the expansion of the tolling provision accomplished through past litigation.
Thomas Infurna

CPLR 3025(c): Amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence adduced at trial precluded when proposed amendment
would add new theory of liability based on previously unpleaded
facts resulting in prejudice
The CPLR mandates that pleadings be liberally construed 1 to
1980) (discussing different uses of various analgesics in treatment of pain). It is suggested
that the penalization of individuals suffering, albeit temporarily, from these afflictions, conflicts with the legislative goal of protecting litigants who already "have difficulty enough."
See SECOND REP. at 58.

See CPLR 3026 (1974). CPLR 3026 provides:
Pleadings shall be liberally construed. Defects shall be ignored if a substantial
right of a party is not prejudiced.
Id. In addition to CPLR 3026, other provisions of the CPLR counsel against a rigid construction of the pleadings. See, e.g., CPLR 3013 (1974) (requiring statements made in pleading to be "sufficiently particular") (emphasis added); CPLR 3017(a) (Supp. 1984-1985) (allowing court to grant "any type of relief . . . appropriate to the proof whether or not
demanded"); CPLR 3025(b) (1974) (requiring leave to amend pleading to be freely given).
One of the major accomplishments of the CPLR was the liberalization of pleadings.
SIEGEL § 207, at 244. The Civil Practice Act, which preceded the CPLR, prohibited the
pleading of evidence and required that pleadings state only material facts. See CPA § 241
(repealed 1963). These rigid pleading requirements of the CPA were abandoned by the
CPLR, which simply requires that the pleadings give the adverse party "notice" of the
"transactions [or] occurrences . . . intended to be proved" and indicate "the material elements of each cause of action or defense." See CPLR 3013 (1974). Generally, "if [any] cause
of action can be spelled out from the four corners of the pleading," then the pleading is
acceptable under the CPLR. See SIEGEL § 208, at 245.
In addition to the rejection of strict pleading requirements, the CPLR abandoned the
"theory of the pleadings" rule, which permitted a party to recover only on the theory
pleaded in his complaint. See id. § 209, at 247.
Soon after the enactment of the CPLR, the judiciary embraced the policy of liberality
contained in the CPLR in Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st
Dep't 1964). See SIEGEL § 208, at 246. In Foley, the First Department vacated an order
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a cause of action because the pleadings, "when
viewed with reason and liberality," were "'sufficiently particular"' to give the defendants
notice of the claims and their material elements. 21 App. Div. 2d at 68-69, 248 N.Y.S.2d at
129-30. The court noted:
1
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ensure the full and fair litigation of a controversy.2 Section 3025(c)
of the CPLR promotes this policy by permitting amendments of
the pleadings before or after judgment to conform them to the evidence adduced at trial.3 It is within the discretion of the courts to
allow such amendments "upon such terms as may be just,"4 proWhere a pleading is attacked for alleged inadequacy in its statements, our inquiry
should be limited to "whether it states in some recognizable form any cause of
action known to our law". . . "However imperfectly, informally or even illogically
the facts may be stated, a complaint ... is deemed to allege 'whatever can be
implied from its statements by fair and reasonable intendment."'
Id. at 65, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 127 (citations omitted). The court added that all pleading
problems should be viewed in light of the CPLR mandate that pleadings" 'shall be liberally
construed"' and defects ignored unless a substantial right of a party is prejudiced. Id. The
goal of the CPLR mandate, according to the court, is to facilitate the timely disposition of
an action on the merits and to "discourage time-consuming pleading attacks." Id. at 65-66,
248 N.Y.S.2d at 127; see also Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 18, 23, 429
N.E.2d 90, 91, 444 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572 (1981) (one of goals of CPLR is liberalization of pleading practice).
2 See Rife v. Union College, 30 App. Div. 2d 504, 505, 294 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (3d Dep't
1968); Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 65 n.2, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 127 n.2 (1st Dep't
1964); Martin v. Katz, 15 App. Div. 2d 767, 767, 224 N.Y.S.2d 311, 311 (1st Dep't 1962)
(mem.); see also CPLR 104 (1974) (CPLR shall be "liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every civil judicial proceeding").
3 CPLR 3025(c) (1974). Section 3025(c) of the CPLR provides:
The court may permit pleadings to be amended before or after judgment to
conform them to the evidence, upon such terms as may be just including the
granting of costs and continuances.
Id. Section 3025(c) is "really an adjunct of the liberalization of pleadings," SIEGEL § 404, at
532, whose purpose is to "divest of impact unprejudicial variances between pleadings and
proof," id. at 532-33, and to ensure that the pleadings reflect the case as it actually was
tried, id,; see 3 WK&M %3025.26, at 30-621 to 30-625.
An amendment to conform the pleadings to the proof may be made by the motion of a
party, 3 WK&M 3025.29, at 30-628, or by the court sua sponte, SIEGEL § 404, at 533; see
Suburban Lawn Serv. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 Misc. 2d 1010, 1012, 328 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586
(Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1972), and will be granted freely in the absence of prejudice, see
SIEGEL § 404, at 532; infra note 5 & accompanying text. Absent prejudice, the amendment
may be permitted during or after the trial, Murray v. City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 400, 405,
372 N.E.2d 560, 562, 401 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (1977); Dittmar Explosives v. A.E. Ottaviano,
Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 498, 502, 231 N.E.2d 756, 758, 285 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (1967), or on appeal for
the first time, see Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 211-12, 168 N.E.2d 654, 658, 203
N.Y.S.2d 829, 834 (1960); Dampskibsselskabet Torm A/S v. P.L. Thomas Paper Co., 26 App.
Div. 2d 347, 352, 274 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606-07 (1st Dep't 1966).
4 CPLR 3025(c) (1974). The condition clause of section 3025(c) is identical to the clause
found in 3025(b); both require amendments to be granted "upon such terms as may be just
including the granting of costs and continuances." Compare CPLR 3025(c) (1974) (amendment of pleadings to conform with evidence) with CPLR 3025(b) (1974). (amendment of
pleadings by leave of court to set forth additional transactions and occurrences). A court,
therefore, has the same discretionary ability to impose conditions or terms in amending a
pleading after trial as it does in amending a pleading before or during trial. See 3 WK&M
3025.30, at 30-630. Conditions are imposed by a court in the interests of justice to alleviate
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vided that no prejudice will result to a party.' The determination
of what constitutes sufficient prejudice to preclude an amendment
remains the subject of much uncertainty and often depends upon
the facts and circumstances of a particular case.' Recently, in
DiMauro v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority,7 the Appellate
Division, Second Department, declined a CPLR 3025(c) amendment of a third-party complaint because of the prejudicial impact
any adverse or prejudicial effect that may result to a party from an amendment of the
pleadings. See CARMODY-WArr 2d, New York Practice,§ 34:47, at 134; 3 WK&M 1 3025.30,
at 30-630. The two most commonly used conditions are those specifically mentioned in the
statute, namely costs and continuances. 3 WK&M V3025.21, at 30-608; 3025.30, at 30-631.
Costs are generally awarded to reimburse a party for additional expenses incurred as a result of an amended pleading. Id.; see, e.g., Mirabella v. Banco Indus., 34 App. Div. 2d 630,
631, 309 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (1st Dep't 1970) (per curiam) (amendment to add new defense
conditioned upon defendant paying plaintiff costs of litigating new issue). Continuances are
generally granted when a party requires additional time to address an issue added or
changed by an amended pleading. 3 WK&M 3025.21, at 30-608; see infra note 23.
6 See Young v. Zwack, 98 App. Div. 2d 913, 914, 471 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176 (3d Dep't 1983);
Sharkey v. Locust Valley Marine, Inc., 96 App. Div. 2d 1093, 1094, 467 N.Y.S.2d 61, 63 (2d
Dep't 1983); see also SIEGEL § 404, at 532 (courts today are quite free with amendment
provided no party can claim prejudice based on it). It is an abuse of discretion, as a matter
of law, for a court to refuse a motion to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence in the absence of surprise or prejudice. Young, 98 App. Div. 2d at 914, 471 N.Y.S.2d
at 176; see Fahey v. County of Ontario, 44 N.Y.2d 934, 935, 380 N.E.2d 146, 147, 408
N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (1978) (mem.); Fultonville Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 91 App. Div. 2d 732, 733, 457 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980 (3d Dep't 1982).
Surprise is the key determinant of the existence of prejudice. See SEIGEL § 404, at 532.
Prejudice will be found when a party could not reasonably have been expected to be prepared for the variance between the pleading and the proof adduced at trial. See CPLR 3025,
commentary at 486 (McKinney 1974). Prejudice in this context must be traceable to a
party's failure to include certain matters in the original pleading which the amended pleading seeks to add. See Wyso v. City of New York, 91 App. Div. 2d 661, 662, 457 N.Y.S.2d 112,
113 (2d Dep't 1982) (quoting SIEGEL § 237, at 289).
The Court of Appeals has defined prejudice in the context of a pleading amendment as
follows:
Prejudice ... is not found in the mere exposure of the defendant to greater liability. Instead, there must be some indication that the defendant has been hindered
in the preparation of his case or has been prevented from taking some measure in
support of his position.
Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 18, 23, 429 N.E.2d 90, 92, 444 N.Y.S.2d
571, 573 (1981) (holding that post-verdict amendment increasing amount of relief requested
in ad damnum clause was not prejudicial because plaintiff had provided list of damages
prior to hearing and defendant's expert had opportunity to investigate damages).
6 Compare Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 211, 168 N.E.2d 654, 658, 203 N.Y.S.2d
829, 834 (1960) (amendment to change theory of separation action from cruelty to abandonment not prejudicial) with Maulella v. Maulella, 90 App. Div. 2d 535, 536-37, 455 N.Y.S.2d
103, 106 (2d Dep't 1982) (proposed amendment to change theory of divorce action from
cruelty and abandonment to adultery deemed prejudicial); see infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
7 105 App. Div. 2d 236, 483 N.Y.S.2d 383 (2d Dep't 1984).
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of evidence produced at trial that introduced an alternate theory
of liability into the case.'
In DiMauro, the plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by her daughter, the
third-party defendant, when the car was involved in a collision
with a bus owned by the defendant, Metropolitan Suburban Bus
Authority (MSBA). 9 The plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt at
the time of the accident because the one at her seat was inoperable. 10 The plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against
the MSBA and the1 2driver of the bus."" The defendants asserted a
"seat belt" defense and impleaded the owner and operator of the
automobile in which the plaintiff was riding, alleging that the vehicle was operated in a negligent manner. 3 At trial, the defendants
introduced expert testimony to establish that the plaintiff would
not have been injured if she had worn a seat belt."4 This testimony
was admitted to substantiate the "seat belt" defense and to support the defendant's contention that the third-party defendant
should be liable for that part of the plaintiff's injuries caused by
15
her failure to provide the plaintiff with an operable seat belt.
Id. at 240-41, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 388-89.
1 Id. at 237, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
10Id. at 238, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 386. In DiMauro,both the plaintiff and the third-party
defendant were aware of the fact that the seat belt was not working. Id. However, three
other seats in the automobile had operable seat belts and were available for use by the
plaintiff.
S

11Id.

12 Id. Under the well-established rule of Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d
164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974), the failure to use an available seat belt can be considered in
mitigation of a plaintiff's damages. See id. at 449-50, 323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at
920; DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 242, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
In DiMauro, the court asserted that the plaintiff's decision to ride in the only seat not
possessing a functioning seat belt constituted the "functional equivalent" of "nonuse of an
available seat belt." 105 App. Div. 2d at 243, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 390. The court maintained,
therefore, that such circumstances could be considered in mitigation of damages. Id. at 24344, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
"l DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 238, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 386. The defendants also commenced a third-party action against the owner-operator of a third vehicle involved in the
collision, but this action was dismissed during the course of the trial. Id. at 238 n.2, 483
N.Y.S.2d at 386 n.2.
14 Id. at 238, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
" See id. In DiMauro, the lower court, contrary to the rule of Spier v. Barker, see
supra note 12, erroneously allowed the jury to determine whether the third-party defendant
was negligent in failing to furnish the plaintiff with an operable seat belt. DiMauro, 105
App. Div. 2d at 242, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389. This instruction permitted the jury to apportion
liability against the third-party defendant twice, once on the issue of liability for causing the
collision, and once on the issue of liability for producing the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 242-
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When the defective seat belt issue was raised, the third-party defendant requested an adjournment in order to procure her own
seat belt expert, but the request was denied.1 6 The Supreme Court,
Trial Term, entered a judgment for the plaintiff and apportioned
liability among the plaintiff, the defendants, and the third-party
defendant. 7
In an appeal by both the plaintiff and the third-party defendant, the Appellate Division reversed the judgment of the trial
court and ordered a new trial. 8 The court explained that the thirdparty complaint, which alleged only negligence in the manner in
which the third-party defendant had "operated" her vehicle, was
insufficient notice that her alleged negligence in failing to repair or
replace the defective seat belt would be a matter in controversy.' 9
This lack of notice, the court reasoned, was prejudicial to the
third-party defendant because it resulted in her inability to retain
a seat belt expert who could refute the testimony offered by the
20
defendants' expert.
Justice Gibbons, writing for the court, determined that the
prejudicial impact on the third-party defendant by the addition at
trial of a new theory of liability supported by new facts precluded
43, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
17 Id. at 237, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 386. The jury determined that the plaintiff was 30%
responsible and the third-party defendant, 50% responsible. Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 239, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88. CPLR 3013, the basic pleading statute, requires
that statements in a pleading be "sufficiently particular" to notify the parties of the transactions and occurrences that will be addressed at trial. See CPLR 3013; SIEGEL § 208, at 245.
The DiMauro court noted that "the essential facts required to give notice of a claim or
defense must generally appear on the face of the pleading, and conclusory allegations will
not suffice." 105 App. Div. 2d at 239, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 387 (citations omitted). The DiMauro
court maintained, therefore, that "the third-party complaint failed in its essential purpose
to focus the court's and the parties' attention on the principal facts and issues to be decided
at the trial" because "the word 'operated' cannot fairly be said to encompass, for the purpose of giving notice, the question of maintaining the seat belts in proper working order."
Id. at 239, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88 (citations omitted). It is submitted that the DiMauro
court's determination that the third-party complaint was insufficient on its face to give notice of the seat belt issue was a correct analysis of the pleading requirements.
20 DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 240, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 388. Justice Gibbons observed
that the procurement of a seat belt expert by the third-party defendant was essential to the
presentation of an appropriate defense on the contribution claim. Id. The court applied the
definition of prejudice outlined by the Court of Appeals in Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 18, 23, 429 N.E.2d 90, 92, 444 N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (1981); see supra note
5, to determine that the lack of notice on the seat belt issue was prejudicial to the thirdparty defendant. DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 240, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 388.

19851

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

an amendment of the pleadings to conform them to the evidence. 2
Although the defective seat belt issue may actually have been revealed to the third-party defendant during discovery, the court
maintained that such personal knowledge would not preclude a
claim of prejudice because a party cannot be expected to address
every cognizable theory of liability arising from an unpleaded set
of facts.2" Finally, the court concluded that Trial Term's refusal to
grant an adjournment to allow the third-party defendant the opportunity to procure the services of a seat-belt expert, was an
abuse of discretion because such a witness was necessary to the
presentation of a successful defense on the defective seat belt
issue.23
It is submitted that the DiMauro court's restrictive interpretation of CPLR 3025(c) violated the spirit of liberality embodied in
the CPLR. 24 In the past, courts acting in accordance with this policy of liberality often have permitted 3025(c) amendments to
change the cause of action asserted,2 5 to introduce a different theory of liability,26 and to alter the nature and amount of relief de21

DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 240, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 388; see infra text accompanying

note 28.
22 DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389; see infra note 37.
23 DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 241-42, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389. A continuance or an
adjournment is the postponement of a trial to a subsequent day or time, see BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY 291 (5th ed. 1979), and is often the appropriate remedy under section 3025(c),
see CPLR 3025, commentary at 489-90 (McKinney 1974). A variance between a pleading
and the proof adduced at trial may legitimately surprise a party who is unprepared to address the new evidence. See SIEGEL § 404, at 533. If the surprise can be remedied by giving
the party additional time to address the new matter and if the court concludes that such a
remedy is more equitable than denying the requested amendment, a continuance becomes
the key to the achievement of a just result. See CPLR 3025, commentary at 486-87 (McKinney 1974).
24 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Kremer Constr. Co. v. City of Yonkers, 73 App. Div. 2d 639, 639, 422
N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (2d Dep't 1979) (amendment to change cause of action from breach of
contract to quantum meruit); Cerrato v. R.H. Crown Co., 58 App. Div. 2d 721, 721, 396
N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (3d Dep't 1977) (amendment of complaint to set forth additional causes
of action in strict liability and breach of warranty). But see Fultonville Frozen Foods, Inc. v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 91 App. Div. 2d 732, 733, 457 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980 (3d Dep't
1982) (denial of amendment to add cause of action in negligence).
26 See, e.g., D'Antoni v. Goff, 52 App. Div. 2d 973, 974, 383 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (3d Dep't
1976) (amendment to change theory of liability from fraud and misrepresentation to mutual
mistake); Dampskibsseiskabet Torm A/S v. P.L. Thomas Paper Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 347,
352, 274 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606-07 (1st Dep't 1966) (judgment theory of liability not originally
pleaded). But see, e.g., Forman v. Davidson, 74 App. Div. 2d 505, 506, 424 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712
(1st Dep't 1980) (denial of amendment to change theory of medical malpractice action);
Xavier v. Grunberg, 67 App. Div. 2d 632, 632, 412 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (lst Dep't 1979) (denial

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:632

manded The DiMauro court conceded that while an amendment
that merely changes the theory of liability is not generally prejudicial, the same cannot be said of a proposed amendment adding a
28
new theory of liability based on new factual allegations. It is sug-

gested, however, that the interjection at trial of a previously unpleaded fact is not inherently more prejudicial than the mere assertion of a new cause of action or an alternate theory of liability.
It is the existence or nonexistence of prejudice itself that is determinative when a court is faced with a motion to amend the pleadings to conform them to the proof adduced at trial.29 Unless a
party can demonstrate that he was substantially misled to his
prejudice, any variance between the pleadings and the evidence introduced at trial, should be corrected by a section 3025(c) amendment" changing the theory of liability,"1 asserting a new or differof amendment to change theory of recovery from constructive notice to actual notice).
The case of Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 211, 168 N.E.2d 654, 658, 203 N.Y.S.2d
829, 834 (1960), decided by the Court of Appeals prior to the enactment of the CPLR,
greatly influenced judicial interpretation of section 3025(c). See CPLR 3025, commentary at
488 (McKinney 1974). The court permitted an amendment to change the theory of a separation action from cruel and inhuman treatment to abandonment. See Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d at
212, 168 N.E.2d at 658, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 834. The court explained:
we have advanced far beyond that hypertechnical period when form was all-important and a pleader had to attach the correct label to his complaint, at the risk
of having it dismissed. It is enough now that a pleader state the facts making out
a cause of action, and it matters not whether he gives a name to the cause of
action at all or even that he gives it a wrong name. If this be true of the cause of
action itself, it is certainly true of the ground underlying it.
Id.
27 See, e.g., Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 18, 24, 429 N.E.2d 90,
92, 444 N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (1981) (post-verdict amendment increasing amount in ad
damnum clause); DeMund v. Martin, 103 App. Div. 2d 837, 839, 478 N.Y.S.2d 362, 365-66
(2d Dep't 1984) (amendment on appeal increasing amount in ad damnum clause); Beck v.
General Tire & Rubber Co., 98 App. Div. 2d 756, 757, 469 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (2d Dep't 1983)
(ad damnum clause amended to include demand for punitive damages). In Loomis, the
Court of Appeals criticized prior judicial rejection of all post-verdict amendments to the ad
damnum clause as inconsistent with the policy of liberality under the CPLR. See 54 N.Y.2d
at 22-23, 429 N.E.2d at 91, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
28 See 105 App. Div. 2d at 240, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
29 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; SIEGEL § 404, at 532; cf. CPLR 3025, commentary at 487 (McKinney 1974) (irremediable prejudice main barrier to 3025(c)
amendment).
30 See supra notes 5 & 29; CPLR 3042, commentary at 689 (McKinney 1974). Absent a
showing of demonstrable prejudice, a variance between pleadings and proof requires the
application of a 3025(c) amendment. CPLR 3042, commentary at 688 (McKinney 1974).
This follows from the fact that the pleadings article of the CPLR is "intolerant of any attempt to make a variance fatal unless the adverse party can say, and he believed, that he
was substantially misled to his prejudice." Id. at 689.
31

See supra note 26.
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ent cause of action,32 or adding a previously unpleaded fact.3
Prejudice exists when a party "has been hindered in the preparation of his case or has been prevented from taking some measure in support of his position. '3 4 Such prejudice manifests itself in
situations in which a party has been surprised by the interjection
of a relevant issue at trial for which he could not reasonably prepare an answer.3 5 A party cannot legitimately claim surprise, however, if a pretrial proceeding put him on notice of an unpleaded
matter.3 6 In DiMauro, the third-party defendant and her attorney
were informed of the defective seat belt during the course of discovery proceedings and other prelitigation matters.37 In addition,
32

See supra note 25.

33 See Bernard v. Zeppetelli, 57 App. Div. 2d 999, 1000, 394 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (3d
Dep't 1977); Pogor v. Cue Taxi Serv., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 487, 488, 251 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964). But see Dubose v. Velez, 63 Misc. 2d 956, 958, 313
N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970) (amendment denied where unpleaded
fact would shift liability). In Bernard, the court permitted a 3025(c) amendment of the
complaint to add factual allegations of negligence. 57 App. Div. 2d at 1000, 394 N.Y.S.2d at
313. The amendment was permitted on the grounds that a 3025(c) motion had been granted
without objection in an earlier proceeding which had ended in a mistrial and that the defendant had time to prepare a defense to the new matter since he received sufficient notice of it
in the earlier proceeding. Id. In Dubose, on the other hand, the court refused a 3025(c)
amendment which would have changed the allegations of negligence sufficiently to shift liability from one defendant to another. 63 Misc. 2d at 960, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
31 See Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 18, 23, 429 N.E.2d 90, 92,
444 N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (1981) (citation omitted); Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 93 App. Div.
2d 998, 999, 461 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (4th Dep't 1983).
- See Sharkey v. Locust Valley Marine, Inc., 96 App. Div. 2d 1093, 1095, 467 N.Y.S.2d
61, 63-64 (2d Dep't 1983); supra note 5 and accompanying text.
30 See SIEGEL § 404, at 532-33. "Where, for example, a deposition or other pretrial disclosure device puts the other party on notice of what later emerges at the trial, the claim of
prejudice dissolves and the amendment lies." Id. at 533; see, e.g., Dublirer v. Lascher, 96
App. Div. 2d 474, 475, 464 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (1st Dep't 1983) (unpleaded matter raised in
prelitigation correspondence and reply papers precluded claim of prejudice); DiBenedetto v.
Lasker-Goldman Corp., 46 App. Div. 2d 909, 910, 363 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6 (2d Dep't 1974) (unpleaded matter raised in plaintiff's pre-trial examination precluded claim of prejudice);
Averill v. Atkins, 32 App. Div. 2d 738, 738, 302 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (4th Dep't 1969) (unpleaded matter raised at pre-trial exam precluded claim of surprise).
37 See 105 App. Div. 2d at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389. In rejecting the contention that
knowledge of the defective seat belt precluded a claim of prejudice, id. at 240-41, 483
N.Y.S.2d at 388-89, the court distinguished the case of Rife v. Union College, 30 App. Div.
2d 504, 294 N.Y.S.2d 460 (3d Dep't 1968). In Rife, the court permitted the plaintiff to
change the theory of his complaint from common law negligence to specific violations of the
Labor Law and Industrial Code. Id. at 504, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 461. The Appellate Division
concluded that there was no prejudice because the amendment simply added a new theory
of liability "based upon the facts formerly alleged." Id. at 505, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
The DiMauro court distinguished Rife on two grounds. First, in Rife, the bill of particulars was served before trial and included the theory of liability added by the amendment,
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the third-party defendant had knowledge of the defective seat belt
at least two days prior to the accident.3 8 Finally, the court implied
that the bill of particulars, although not supplied until after commencement of the trial, had addressed the third-party defendant's
failure to provide the passenger with an operable seat belt.39 It is
see id. at 504-05, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62; the bill of particulars in DiMauro was not supplied until after the commencement of trial, see 105 App. Div. 2d at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at
388-89. Second, in Rife, the additional theory of liability added by the amendment did not
involve the addition of any previously unpleaded facts, see 30 App. Div. 2d at 241, 294
N.Y.S.2d at 462; in DiMauro, the third-party complaint did not contain any factual allegations regarding the defective seat belt, see 105 App. Div. 2d at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
While these distinctions are indeed valid, it is submitted that the Rife and DiMauro
cases are not as dissimilar as Justice Gibbons suggested. In allowing an amendment of the
complaint in Rife, the court emphasized the fact that the defendant had received notice of
the additional theory throughout the pretrial proceedings. See Rife, 30 App. Div. 2d at 505,
294 N.Y.S.2d at 462. Similarly, in DiMauro, the third party-defendant and her attorney
were made aware of the defective seat belt issue during the pretrial proceedings. See 105
App. Div. 2d at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389. It is suggested that if pretrial proceedings were
sufficient to provide notice to the defendant in Rife of a matter not pleaded in the complaint, then the knowledge of the defective seat belt gained by the third-party defendant
through pretrial proceedings in DiMauro should have been sufficient to preclude a claim of
prejudice based upon absence of notice. In addition, it should be noted that, in both cases,
the claim of prejudice involved the defendant's inability to procure witnesses. Compare
Rife, 30 App. Div. 2d at 505, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (defendant's inability to secure witness)
with DiMauro,105 App. Div. 2d at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389 (third-party defendant's inability to obtain expert seat belt witness). The Rife court, however, rejected the defendant's
allegation that he was denied the right to call a witness to his defense, on the ground that it
was "illusory" and insufficient to serve as the basis of a claim of prejudice. See 30 App. Div.
2d at 505, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 238, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
" See id. at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 388-89. "'The purpose of a bill of particulars is to
amplify the pleadings, limit the proof and prevent surprise at the trial.'" CPLR 3041, commentary at 622 (McKinney 1974) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Assoc., 34 App. Div. 2d 769, 770, 311 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (1st Dep't
1970)). A defendant who learns something from a plaintiff's bill of particulars that technically should have'been in the pleadings, but was not, is not prejudiced. See CPLR 3041,
commentary at 628 (McKinney 1974). In addition, "[clonsidering that the bill of particulars
is a relatively early step in the litigation, it will usually be found to appear early enough to
divest the adverse party of any claim of prejudice." Id.; see, e.g., Murray v. City of New
York, 43 N.Y.2d 400, 406, 372 N.E.2d 560, 563, 401 N.Y.S.2d 773, 776 (1977) (matter of
workmen's compensation came as no surprise to plaintiff since bill of particulars stated that
city was decedent's employer); Miller v. Perillo, 71 App. Div. 2d 389, 390-91, 422 N.Y.S.2d
424, 425 (1st Dep't 1979) (defendant had sufficient information prior to trial by virtue of
general content of bill of particulars to preclude claim of surprise).
If a party fails to supply the bill of particulars within the requisite period of time, the
opposing party may make a motion to preclude. See CPLR 3042(c); CPLR 3042, commentary at 684 (McKinney 1974). If the court grants the preclusion, the party who failed to
serve the bill in time will be precluded from introducing into evidence anything as to which
he failed to serve particulars. CPLR 3042, commentary at 684 (McKinney 1974). It is suggested that because the third-party defendant in DiMauro neglected to make a motion to
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submitted that the third-party defendant's subjective knowledge,
coupled with the notice received through disclosure devices such as
the discovery proceeding and the bill of particulars, should have
precluded a claim of prejudice, and that the third-party complaint
should have been amended to conform to the evidence provided at
trial.
It is suggested that an amendment of the pleadings under section 3025(c) should be barred only by the existence of actual and
substantial prejudice incapable of remedy by the imposition of
costs and continuances, 40 and should not be precluded by a mere
technical defect in the pleading. 41 Such a standard would further
the purpose of the CPLR while diminishing the importance of
pleadings to underscore the substantive rights involved, 42 and the
merits.4 3
Nancy L. Montmarquet

CPLR 3211: Admission that contract existed does not defeat defendant's motion to dismiss based on a statute of frauds defense
Section 3211(a)(5) of the CPLR permits a defendant to move
to dismiss a cause of action on the ground that the plaintiff has
failed to satisfy the statute of frauds.' For purposes of the motion,
preclude once the third-party plaintiff had failed to timely serve the particulars, the bill
should be treated as if it had been served in a timely manner and should be deemed sufficient notice of the defective seat belt.
40 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also CPLR 3025, commentary at 487
(McKinney 1974) (irremediable prejudice main barrier to amendment under 3025(c)).
It is suggested that in DiMauro, no actual or substantial prejudice existed because any
adverse effect on the third-party defendant resulting from the interjection of the seat belt
issue at trial could have been alleviated by the granting of a continuance. This would have
provided additional time for the third-party defendant to prepare to address this new issue
by securing the services of a seat belt expert who could have testified on her behalf. See
DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
"4See Forman v. Davidson, 74 App. Div. 2d 505, 506, 424 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (1st Dep't
1980) (Fein, J., dissenting) ("the plea of surprise should be based on actual surprise, not
merely deficiencies in pleading").
42 See CPLR 3025, commentary at 486 (McKinney 1974).
4'See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

CPLR 3211(a)(5) (1970). Section 3211(a)(5) provides that "[a] party may move for

